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Introduction
Tests of the efficiency of foreign exchange
markets continue to proliferate. Because these
markets have become worldwide in scope and
nonstop in operation, economists have been
able to test many hypotheses about how infor-
mation becomes incorporated into prices and
transferred between markets in different loca-
tions. However, the finding that forward rates
for foreign exchange are not unbiased predic-
tors of future spot rates remains without a
coherent explanation.
It seems reasonable to speculate on the role
that central-bank intervention plays in such find-
ings. After all, central banks may possess infor-
mation not available to other traders. However,
since central banks usually have not made avail-
able to the public accurate information about
their daily foreign exchange activities, it has
been difficult to determine if intervention influ-
ences foreign exchange market efficiency.
Greater interest in central-bank intervention
has also been stimulated by an increase in the
frequency of intervention. During the period of
ostensibly floating rates, central-bank interven-
tion policy has been, at various times, designed
either to influence the level of the exchange
rate or to reduce its volatility. Specifically, as dis-
cussed by Funabashi (1989) and Dominguez
(1990), soon after the Plaza accord in September
1985, the finance ministers of the G-5 (France,
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States) agreed to reduce the dollar's ex-
change value. Then, at the Louvre meeting in
1987, they decided to shift to a regime of stabili-
zation. Thus, there is a clear interest in analyz-
ing the impact of intervention on both the level
and volatility of exchange rates.
This paper examines the relationship between
G-3 (Germany, Japan, and the United States)
central-bank intervention and bid-ask spreads in
the German mark/U.S. dollar (DM/$) and yen/U.S.
dollar (yen/$) spot and forward foreign exchange
markets. Bid-ask spreads may be related to vola-
tility and risk. The examination is stimulated by
the speculation of Bossaerts and Hillion (199D,
henceforth referred to as B/H, that an intraweekly
pattern in intervention explains the intraweekly
pattern in bid-ask spreads that they observed for
the currencies in the European Monetary System.
They determine that bid-ask spreads are higher
on Fridays and that taking account of such asym-
metry alters conclusions regarding the efficiency
of forward markets. B/H surmise that the higher
Friday bid-ask spreads are related to marketparticipants' anticipation that decisions about
intervention will be undertaken on weekends.
Here, I utilize official intervention data to see if
G-3 intervention influences G-3 spreads. To the
best of my knowledge, this is the first time that
such an investigation has been undertaken.
The organization of this paper is as follows.
Section I reviews selected literature on forward
market efficiency and the impact of central-bank
intervention. Section II discusses the data on inter-
vention and the bid-ask spreads. In the third sec-
tion, I examine 1) intraweekly patterns in bid-ask
spreads, 2) holiday effects, 3) intraweekly patterns
in intervention, 4) bid-ask spreads over periods
of nonintervention versus intervention, and 5)
Granger-causality tests for the intervention-spread
relations. Section IV concludes and summarizes.
I find that 1) bid-ask spreads are higher on
Fridays for both spot and forward G-3 exchange
rates, 2) intervention is no more likely to occur
on Mondays than on other days, 3) for both cur-
rencies, periods of purported intervention are
associated with lower, rather than higher, bid-
ask spreads, 4) conditional on whether or not
intervention occurred, expectations of interven-
tion seem to be associated with lower spreads,
and 5) intervention generally does not Granger-
cause spreads. Overall, there appears to be little
evidence to support the view that spreads widen
in anticipation of intervention. A more plausible
view is that the expectation of intervention has
a negative impact on spreads. A structural model
of the relations among intervention, spreads,
and volatility would be necessary to address




A small body of literature focuses on the determi-
nation of foreign exchange bid-ask spreads. Flood
(199D provides a summary of the theory and
points out the difficulties in applying to the foreign
exchange market the framework used to analyze
securities market spreads.
1 A unique aspect of
spread determination in exchange markets is that
two trading structures coexist. There are market-
makers, who provide both bids and asks upon
demand, and brokers, who quote the best bids
• 1 George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) provide a recent summary
of the findings regarding spreads in equity markets. They conclude that only
8 to 13 percent of the spreads can be explained by adverse selection and
claim that the predominant influence on equity spreads is processing costs.
and asks from their books of orders. Flood sug-
gests that adverse selection costs and inventory
holding costs are likely influences on market-
maker spreads. Adverse selection influences
spreads if market-makers confront traders who
have inside information and who are thus able
to speculate against the market-maker. Inven-
tory holding costs are influenced by the possi-
bility of unfavorable price changes during the
time that currencies are held.
Flood submits that models of brokers' spreads
are less applicable to the foreign exchange mar-
ket, where (unlike in securities markets) brokerage
and market-making are separated. One distinction
between the two activities is that brokerage main-
tains the anonymity of the transacting parties. It is
worth noting that U.S. intervention operations util-
ize both market-makers, who generally are com-
mercial and investment banks, and brokers.
"Secret" intervention occurs via a broker. Interven-
tion via a market-maker may increase spreads,
since a market-maker could view the intervening
central bank as having inside information. This is
the mechanism to which B/H refer.
Early empirical work by Fieleke (1975) and
Overturf (1982) shows that spreads are positively
related to foreign-domestic interest differentials and
exchange volatility. Allen (1977) provides a theoreti-
cal rationale for the volatility-spread relation. Black
(1989), Boothe (1988), Glassman (1987), and Wei
(1991) find that spreads are positively related to
transactions volume. Although a lower rate of trans-
actions could influence the risk component of the
spread by increasing the length of time an open
position would be held, it is also possible that vola-
tility and volume are determined simultaneously.
Intervention and
Risk Premia
Though B/H contend that intervention influences
the spread, most investigations have viewed inter-
vention as influencing a risk premium defined in
other terms, as discussed below. However, it is not
at all clear that a significant risk premium exists
(see Hakkio and Sibert [1991]). The existence of a
time-varying risk premium is only one of the pos-
sible explanations of the finding that the forward
rate is not an unbiased and efficient predictor of
future spot rates.
The unbiasedness and efficiency of forward
rates has been widely tested by analyzing varia-
tions on equation (I).
2
• 2 Baillie and McMahon (1989) and Hodrick (1987) provide com-
prehensive reviews of this literature.(1)
where the left side is the expectation at time t
of the spot exchange rate k periods in the future
and the right side is the forward rate at time t
for a transaction at time t+ k. In practice,
Et{St+k) is replaced by Sl+k; S and F are often
replaced by their logarithms or by (St+k- St)/St




As summarized by Baillie (1989), a consensus
against unbiasedness has emerged—the hypoth-
esis that a = 0 and that P = 1 is usually rejected.
One possible explanation is the presence of a risk
premium. Equation (1) could be expected to hold
purely as the outcome of arbitrage among risk-
neutral speculators who can take an open position
in the forward market based on their expectation
of the future spot rate at which positions would
have to be covered. On the other hand, the
portfolio-balance approach to exchange-rate de-
termination considers risk-averse investors who
choose holdings of assets denominated in differ-
ent currencies. If such assets are imperfect substi-
tutes, then factors such as relative asset supplies
will influence exchange rates and imply rejection
of the unbiasedness hypothesis.
B/H suggest that the frequent use of the aver-
age of the bids and asks in equations (1) and
(2) is inappropriate and claim that intervention
is responsible for an asymmetry of the true
price around the average of bids and asks. Other
possible theoretical explanations include the
inapprdpriateness of the rational expectations
assumption (Frankel and Froot [1987]), the pos-
sibility that policy changes would lead to ex post
biasedness even if unbiasedness held ex ante
(Lewis [1988]), anticipation of real exchange-
rate changes (Levine [1989]), and the existence
of liquidity premia (Engel [1990] ).
4
A variety of approaches, summarized by
Hodrick (1987), imply a time-varying risk pre-
mium. Lucas (1978) relates the risk premium to
• 3 These transformations ameliorate problems introduced by the non-
stationarity of exchange rates (see Baillie and McMahon [1989] or Hodrick
[19871 for details) and Siegel's paradox. Siegel's paradox states that if equa-
tion (1) holds when S and F are expressed as units of currency A per unit
of currency B, then it cannot also hold for the inverse rates, because E(1/X)
and ME(X) are not equal.
• 4 Other possibilities include Siegel's paradox and transactions
costs. Research has generally concluded, however, that these are not im-
portant empirically. See Baillie and McMahon (1989) for a summary.
the conditional covariance between a long posi-
tion in the forward market and the marginal rate
of substitution between future and current con-
sumption. Hodrick (1989) shows how the risk
premium in the forward market can be more
directly related to the conditional variance of
market fundamentals, such as money supply
and government spending. Osterberg (1989)
modifies Hodrick's paper to show how interven-
tion can influence the risk premium in the for-
ward market. In general, evidence in favor of
the existence of a risk premium in the forward
market is weak (see Engel and Rodrigues [1989J,
Kaminsky and Peruga [1990], and Mark [1988]).
This may result in part from using data of no
higher than monthly frequency in analyzing the
relationship between the forward-rate forecast
error and either consumption or money.
5 Vola-
tility measures such as conditional variance ex-
hibit less time variation when constructed from
data of lower frequency.
Measurement and testing issues are also in-
volved with the controversy over the existence
of risk premia in forward rates. B/H determine
that the use of the average of bids and asks in
tests of forward market efficiency ignores the
information contained in the bid-ask spread,
biases the test results, and distorts the magnitude
of the implied risk premium. In this paper, I
focus on the authors' contention that the bid-
ask spread widens when the market anticipates
intervention, because the possibility of interven-
tion induces an adverse selection problem for
market-makers or brokers. B/H conclude that
the spreads are wider on Fridays.
Other investigators have found evidence of
day-of-the-week effects in foreign exchange
markets.
7 Glassman (1987) finds that bid-ask
spreads are higher on Fridays and on days
before market holidays. So (1987) confirms pre-
vious findings that exchange rates on Monday
• 5 There are indirect approaches to testing for a risk premium using
daily data. One approach is that taken by Levine (1989), who tests the im-
plication of many asset-pricing models that the risk premium embedded
in the forward rate is exactly equal to the risk premium in the differential
in real interest rates. Giovannini and Jorion (1987) test for the influence
of various proxies for a risk premium, such as lagged forward rates and
squared interest rates.
• 6 Bekaert and Hodrick (1991) discuss the impact on the measure-
ment of risk premia of 1) matching forward and spot quotes so as to be
consistent with settlement conventions in the foreign exchange markets
and 2) the use of averages of bids and asks.
• 7 Thaler (1987) summarizes the evidence regarding day-of-the-
week effects in equity markets, but finds no consistent explanation of the
results. Negative returns from Friday to Monday are due to the change
from the Friday close to the Monday open. Highest returns are on Wed-
nesday and Friday. Returns also tend to be lower on days before holidays.and Wednesday tend to be higher than on Thurs-
day and Friday. McFarland, Petit, and Sung (1982)
contend that these findings may be related to set-
tlement conventions and to the fact that money
supply announcements are made on Thursday.
Baillie and Osterberg (1991) examine the forward-
rate error with daily data and find that conditional
variances are higher on Fridays and before holi-
days. Baillie and Bollerslev (1989) estimate a
generalized autoregressive conditional heterosce-
dasticity (GARCH) model for daily exchange rates
and determine that conditional variances are
higher on Mondays and lower on Thursdays.
Humpage and Osterberg (1992) estimate a
GARCH model for the risk premium implied by
the deviation from uncovered interest parity for
the G-3 currencies. They find that the risk pre-
mium for the DM/$ is lower on Thursdays and
that the conditional variance of the deviation for
the yen/$ is higher on Fridays and around holi-
days. Hsieh (1988) concludes that daily exchange-
rate distributions are not independently and
identically distributed across days and that there
are no day-of-the-week effects in the mean of the
exchange-rate change. However, he does find
that variances are larger when the trading period




The linkage between intervention and bid-ask
spreads has not previously been examined. In-
stead, studies of intervention view it as influencing
risk premia or conditional variances. Most analyses
have concentrated on sterilized intervention, partly
because there is interest in whether it can be
viewed as a policy lever in addition to monetary
and fiscal policies.
8 Unsterilized intervention is
equivalent to monetary policy.
The two major channels through which steril-
ized intervention can influence exchange rates
are the portfolio-balance channel and the signal-
ing channel.
9 Sterilized intervention alters the
• 8 A country sterilizes its intervention when it negates the initial
impact of the intervention on its money supply through an offsetting
open-market transaction. For example, when U.S. authorities purchase
marks with dollars, the supply of dollars is increased. Selling U.S.
government securities in the same amount as the intervention removes
dollars and sterilizes the intervention.
• 9 Some authors have suggested other channels. Humpage (1988)
finds that intervention sometimes provides "news" other than about future
monetary policy. Dominguez (1988) discusses how intervention can have
an influence by misleading exchange market participants. The vast major-
ity of theoretical and empirical research focuses on the portfolio-balance
and signaling channels.
relative supplies of domestic and foreign bonds
and, if investors are risk averse and if domestic
and foreign bonds are imperfect substitutes,
leads to a readjustment of rates of return via the
exchange rate; this is the portfolio-balance
mechanism. The impact of intervention operat-
ing through the portfolio-balance channel can
be mitigated by three conditions: 1) perfect sub-
stitutability, 2) Ricardian equivalence, under
which consumers perfectly anticipate future
taxes associated with the change in government
debt, and 3) the slight effect of intervention on
asset supplies.
The signaling channel is usually analyzed with-
in the asset-market approach to exchange-rate
determination. Exchange rates equal the present
discounted value of future economic fundamen-
tals. If monetary authorities have inside informa-
tion, intervention may signal future monetary
policies. For example, a sterilized purchase of
marks by the United States may lead to an appre-
ciation in marks (a decrease in the DM/$ rate) if
the purchase is believed to signal inside informa-
tion (more expansionary U.S. monetary policy)
that increases the expected future exchange rate.
The question arises as to why intervention is
the type of signal chosen. One answer may be
that it gives authorities an incentive to follow
through with the expected policy. For example, if
authorities have just purchased foreign currency,
they may wish to see an appreciation in its value.
On the other hand, since intervention does not re-
quire an immediate change in the monetary base,
market participants may be misled. However, if
the subsequent monetary policy is not consistent
with that implied by the initial action, the effective-
ness of future intervention may be reduced. This
has led some to suggest that intervention is an
effective signal only if followed by consistent mon-
etary policy. If this is true, however, it is not clear
that intervention is independent of monetary pol-
icy. Humpage (1991) discusses concerns asso-
ciated with this point.
Empirical evidence suggests that the signal-
ing channel is probably of more significance
than the portfolio-balance channel. Early stud-
ies of the latter, summarized by Obstfeld (1988),
generally find that intervention has little impact
or that coefficients' signs are inconsistent with
theory. One reason for the small estimated im-
pact is that intervention is minute relative to the
outstanding stocks of assets. Another reason
may be that calculation of asset supplies pre-
cludes the use of high-frequency data.
Studies that utilize relatively high-frequency
data have found signaling effects. Dominguez
(1988) examines weekly data on money surprises,exchange rates, and intervention and concludes
that the effectiveness of intervention as a signal
depends on the credibility of the implied monetary
policy. In a later paper, Dominguez (1990) finds
the distinction between coordinated and unilateral
intervention to be important. If the mechanism
was portfolio balance, only the change in relative
asset supplies would matter.
1
0
Few studies use both daily exchange-rate
data and official intervention data, as does this
paper. Dominguez (1990), Loopesko (1984),
and Humpage and Osterberg (1992) use official
data to examine the impact of intervention on
the risk premium implied by deviations from
uncovered interest parity. All three studies find
significant effects of intervention. Baillie and
Humpage (1992) estimate a simultaneous sys-
tem in which intervention either "leans against
the wind" or seeks to stabilize volatile markets.
They determine that intervention influences the
conditional variance of the exchange rate. Bail-
lie and Osterberg (1991) examine intervention's
impact on the conditional mean and variance of
the daily forward-rate forecast error, finding that
U.S. purchases of foreign currency influence the
conditional mean. If efficiency is assumed, the
mean is interpreted as a risk premium.
B/H and Hung (199D both view intervention
as operating via the market microstructure of
heterogeneous traders. In B/H, traders face the
possibility that the central bank may decide to
push the rate down or up. As a result, traders
may find that they have offered to buy too high
or to sell too low. In either case, the dealer sets
a wider bid-ask spread.
Hung (1991) considers a signaling role for
intervention that differs from that discussed by
Dominguez. If doubts about credibility make
intervention an ineffective signal of monetary
policy, and if the market is without a strong di-
rection, public intervention can influence the
trading strategies of chartists or other nonfunda-
mental traders. A strong implication of this is
that the central bank must know the current
market trading strategies. In addition, the ability
of intervention to increase or decrease volatility
depends on market conditions. For example, if
the dollar is acknowledged to be overvalued but
is still moving upward, the Fed would prefer to
wait until a short-term downward movement
• 10 Dominguez and Frankel (1991) and Ghosh (1989) attempt to
distinguish between portfolio-balance and signaling channels. Using
monthly data, Ghosh finds that portfolio-balance variables add a small
but significant effect to exchange rates. With weekly data, Dominguez and
Frankel determine that the signaling mechanism enhances the portfolio
balance effect.
began, which it could encourage through secret
intervention. Selling dollars with this downward
trend would increase volatility. However, if the
dollar is on a strong downward trend, the Fed
could help it move down and decrease volatility
by countering short-term upward movements.
II. Data
The exchange-rate data were provided by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. At 10:00
a.m. of each day on which the New York market
is open, the Bank obtains both bid and ask
quotes for the spot and forward rates for the
DM/$ and the yen/$. The intervention data were
provided by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
1
1 I analyze four series:
U.S. purchases of dollars vis-a-vis the mark, Ger-
man purchases of dollars (sales of marks), U.S.
purchases of dollars vis-a-vis the yen, and Jap-
anese purchases of dollars (sales of yen).
The sample period is from August 6,1985 to
September 6,1991- However, because not all
Japanese and German holidays coincide, the num-
ber of observations differs for the two exchange
rates under examination. The intervention data
are close-of-business (COB) net daily purchases,
measured in $1 million units. The following analy-
sis attempts to account for the fact that the foreign
exchange quotes are not contemporaneous with
the intervention numbers. Unfortunately, the avail-
able data do not permit discrimination between
interventions that occur via a broker and those
that occur via market-makers.
III. Results
Table 1 presents the bid-ask spreads for both
the spot and forward rates for the DM/$ and
yen/$ for each day of the week. Beneath the
spreads are the t-statistics for the hypothesis
that each day's spread is equal to the Friday
spread. Except for the Tuesday numbers for
both the spot and forward spreads for the yen/$,
the two-tailed test indicates rejection of the null
at the 5 percent level. In all cases, the null is
rejected at 10 percent. The Friday versus non-
Friday tests are consistent with these results.
Table 2 looks at holiday effects in the spreads.
This focus is motivated by three facts: First, mar-
kets by definition are closed on holidays as well
as on weekends (although markets may be open
elsewhere in the world on U.S., German, or
• 11 The data on U.S. intervention are now publicly available from

































































































a. Significant at the 5 percent level for a two-tailed test.
b. Significant at the 10 percent level for a two-tailed test.
NOTE: Entries for "spot" and "forward" are the average bid-ask spreads. The t-tests are for the differences from the Friday spreads. "N" indi-
cates the number of observations.
SOURCE: Author's calculations.
Japanese bank holidays). If spreads are higher
on Fridays because markets are going to be
closed and prices therefore cannot "reveal" in-
formation, spreads may also be higher on days
before holidays. Second, an examination of the
intervention data shows that intervention does
not occur on weekends, although it does some-
times occur on U.S., German, or Japanese
holidays in markets that are still open. If market
participants are aware of these facts, and if an-
ticipated intervention widens spreads, then
spreads will indeed be wider on days before
holidays. Third, since more holidays are on
Mondays than on any other day, the "Friday
effect" could be a "holiday effect." In order to
focus on the possible influence of intervention
on spreads, I isolate a pure holiday effect by
controlling for whether or not the day before a
holiday falls on a Friday. I also present the com-
parisons necessary to detect a pure Friday effect.
The results show that spreads are higher on
days before holidays, but there is mixed evi-
dence of a pure holiday effect. First, although
spreads are higher on Fridays before holidays
than on other Fridays, the difference is not sig-
nificant for any of the four spreads. Second, for
other days before holidays, both spot and for-
ward spreads are wider for the DM/$ rates, but
not for the yen/$ rates. There is also mixed evi-
dence for a pure Friday effect. In terms of both
currencies and spreads, Fridays not before
holidays are higher than non-Fridays not before
holidays. However, there are no significant dif-
ferences between Fridays not before holidays
and non-Fridays not before holidays.
These comparisons provide no compelling
reason to think that higher spreads on Fridays
are due to the fact that many Fridays fall before
holidays on which intervention may occur. The
last column of table 2 compares spreads on
days before single holidays with spreads on
days before consecutive holidays. The spreads
on days before multiple holidays are lower
than, but not significantly different from, days
before single holidays.
The remaining tables present information
about the relationship between the daily and
holiday patterns in spreads and intervention.
1
2
Ideally, data on expected intervention would be
used to test the hypotheses presented by B/H.
Newspapers regularly report intervention. Such
reports, however, often either mention inter-
vention that did not occur or fail to note actual
intervention (see Klein [1992]). Another consid-
eration is that while the foreign exchange
quotes are as of 10:00 a.m., the intervention
data are as of COB.
• 12 Intervention rarely occurred on holidays. The United States and
Germany intervened five and nine times, respectively, in the DM/$ mar-
ket. The United States and Japan intervened eight and 13 times, respec-
















































































































a. Significant at the 5 percent level for a two-tailed test.
NOTE: Entries for "spot" and "forward" are the average bid-ask spreads. "N" indicates the number of observations.
Explanation of columns:
A: Days before market holidays
B: (~A) Days not before market holidays
C: (Fri., A) Fridays before market holidays
D: (Fri., -A) Fridays not before market holidays
E: (-Fri., A) Non-Fridays before market holidays
F: (~Fri., -A) Non-Fridays not before market holidays
G: Days before multiple, consecutive market holidays
H: Days before single market holidays
Explanation of t-statistics:
(H), (F) distinguish tests designed to isolate pure day-before-holiday and Friday effects, respectively.
B: Days before holidays compared to days not before holidays
C: Fridays before holidays compared to non-Fridays before holidays
D: Fridays before holidays compared to Fridays not before holidays
E: Fridays not before holidays compared to non—Fridays not before holidays
F: Non-Fridays before holidays compared to non-Fridays not before holidays
H: Days before multiple holidays compared to days before single holidays
SOURCE: Author's calculations.
Table 3 presents the daily variation in fre-
quency of intervention. B/H suggest that deci-
sions about intervention took place over the
weekend for the currencies in the European
Monetary System. If this were true for the G-3,
we may expect to see more intervention occur-
ring on Mondays. However, there is no signifi-
cant evidence that this is the case.
Rather than define periods of intervention as
days on which intervention officially occurred
ex post, in table 4,1 use two measures of ex-
pected intervention. Panel A compares the bid-
ask spreads over periods usually thought of as
times of intervention as opposed to "noninter-
vention" periods. Ignored for the moment is the
issue of whether intervention actually occurred
at these times. The intervention periods are
defined as 9/1/85 to 12/31/85, 9/1/86 to 1/1/87,
2/1/87 to 6/1/87, and 10/1/87 to 12/31/87. The
most noteworthy dates are 9/22/85 (Plaza ac-
cord), 2/23/87 (Louvre accord), and 10/19/87
(the U.S. stock market crash). Dominguez
(1990) presents reasons to focus on the wider














































































NOTE: Entries for each country are the proportion of days on which intervention occurred. T-statistics are for the difference between the Mon-



































































































a. Significant at the 5 percent level for a two-tailed test.
b. Significant at the 10 percent level for a two-tailed test.
NOTE: T-statistics for panels A and B are for the intervention-nonintervention difference. T-statistics for panel C are for the differences from the
A:l, B:l spreads. "N" indicates the number of observations.
Explanation of panel C:
A: 1, B: 1: Days on which intervention was expected and realized
A:l, B:2: Days on which intervention was expected but not realized
A:2, B:l: Days of "surprise" intervention
A:2, B:2: Days on which intervention was neither expected nor realized
SOURCE: Author's calculations.period is defined as all other days. For purposes
of comparability, the panel A calculations leave
out the post-1987 subsample. Both DM/$ and
yen/$ spreads are significantly lower during
periods of purported intervention.
Panel B of table 4 compares spreads from days
within actual intervention periods with days from
periods when intervention did not occur. Specifi-
cally, if either the United States or Germany was
intervening on day t- 1 and on day t, the 10:00
a.m. day t quote on the DM/$ is said to be from a
period of intervention. If both countries were not
intervening on either day, the quote is from a non-
intervention period. In effect, this indicates that if
there was intervention on day t- 1 (ex post) and
intervention as of COB on day t, it is likely that, at
10:00 a.m. on day t, traders perceived that they
were in the midst of a period of intervention. Table
4 shows that the yen/$ spreads were significantly
higher during these periods, while the DM/$ rates
were lower, though not significantly so.
Panel C further refines these measures of ex-
pected intervention.
1
3 The periods of purported
intervention analyzed in panel A might be better
thought of as periods when intervention was
likely to have been anticipated. The "two con-
secutive days" criterion utilized in panel B may
better identify periods of actual intervention.
Thus, one possible explanation of the higher
spreads for the yen/$ in panel B may be that
not all intervention that occurred during two
consecutive days was anticipated. Days that fell
into the first columns of both panels A and B
may more closely identify intervention that was
both expected and realized. Days that fell into
both of the second columns tell us when inter-
vention neither occurred nor was expected. The
in-between cases are when days met only one
of the criteria. Panel C provides the results for
all four cases.
All four of the t-statistics imply significant dif-
ferences at the 10 percent level, and the relative
magnitudes of the spreads are consistent with
my interpretation of panel A. Spreads are lower
when actual intervention was expected than when
intervention was neither expected nor realized.
Spreads when intervention was expected but not
realized lie between the "expected intervention"
and "neither" cases. In addition, conditional on
whether intervention occurred as defined by the
panel B criterion, spreads are lower when inter-
vention was anticipated, as defined in panel A.
This weakens the qualification that the yen/$
• 13 I am grateful to Jacky So for suggesting this further refinement.
Because B/H claim that anticipation of intervention widens spreads, theirs
is a claim about weak-form market efficiency. Use of actual, confidential
intervention data is relevant for tests of strong-form efficiency.
findings in panel B had for concluding that inter-
vention lowers spreads. More important, how-
ever, panel C is contrary to the B/H hypothesis
that expectations of intervention increase bid-
ask spreads.
Causality should not be inferred from correla-
tions such as those presented here. While B/H
contend that spreads widen in anticipation of in-
tervention, at times intervention has been in-
tended to counter volatility. Bid-ask spreads
may in part reflect volatility, and thus interven-
tion and bid-ask spreads may be correlated be-
cause of attempts to counter volatility reflected
in spreads.
In the absence of a fully specified model of
the determinants of the spreads and of the re-
sponse of intervention to market movements, I
utilize the concept of Granger-causality to learn
more about the temporal relations between
spreads and intervention. Granger-causality util-
izes equations of the form
p 1






Here, / and S are each regressed on past val-
ues of themselves and on lagged values of the
other variable. I Granger-causes S if past values
of I improve upon the ability of past values of S
to predict S. Since the focus is on whether inter-
vention Granger-causes spreads, I test for the
significance of the bSI's?
4 However, before esti-
mating these equations, I test for the presence of
unit roots in the spreads. The presence of such
effects would imply a type of nonstationarity that
would invalidate the results. I consistently reject
the null that such an effect existed.
1
5 In addition,
the length of the autoregressions, p, q, r, and s,
must be chosen. I arrive at a lag length of 20 by
considering successively longer lag lengths (10,
15, 20, and 25) and by testing whether the addi-
tional terms are significant.
• 14 Alternative concepts of, and tests for, causality are presented by
Granger and Newbold (1986).
• 15 These tests were performed with both the Dickey-Fuller and
Phillips-Perron procedures, both with and without deterministic trends.
The number of lagged first differences on the right side was the minimum
number to produce residuals that were free of serial correlation as meas-
ured by Box-Ljung Q statistics. Baillie and McMahon (1989, pp. 105—
107) discuss these test procedures. The results of the unit root tests are
available from the author.TABLE 5
Granger-Causality Tests: Intervention
















NOTE: Significance levels are for the likelihood ratio tests of whether the vec-
tor of intervention terms Granger-causes the vector of spreads.
SOURCE: Author's calculations.
Table 5 presents the results of the tests for
Granger-causality from intervention to
spreads.
1
6 This is done for each currency, so that
when DM/$ (yen/$) spreads are on the left side,
then lagged DM/$ (yen/$) spreads, lagged Ger-
man (Japanese), and lagged U.S. intervention
are on the right side. For the full sample, there
is no evidence of Granger-causality from inter-
vention at conventional levels of significance.
Table 5 also presents the results of the same
causality tests when the sample was split at the
end of 1985 and the second subperiod ends at
the close of 1986. Hung (1991) suggests that the
impact of U.S. intervention on unexpected vol-
atility changed over these periods in response
to different market conditions, as discussed
above. U.S. and Japanese intervention Granger-
causes yen/$ spreads for the first subperiod. No
such effect is found for the three other tests. It is
well known, however, that such tests should
not be interpreted in terms of structural models.
IV. Summary
In a recent article, Bossaerts and Hillion (1991)
present evidence that tests of forward market
efficiency that ignore variation in the bid-ask
spread are biased, at least for currencies in the
European Monetary System. They observe that
spreads are wider on Fridays and speculate that
this may be due to anticipation of central-bank
intervention. In this paper, I use official data on
intervention to see if it can explain intraweekly
patterns in G-3 spreads.
The tests confirm the tendency for Friday
spreads to be higher than for other days of the
week and also find some evidence of holiday
effects. However, there is no evidence that intra-
weekly patterns in intervention are related to
the patterns in spreads. In addition, I find no evi-
dence to support the conclusion that anticipa-
tion of intervention widened spreads. Last,
Granger-causality tests suggest that intervention
generally does not lead spreads.
Although I cannot interpret such results in
terms of a structural model, previous research
has documented that intervention influences
risk premia and that conditional variances ex-
hibit intraweekly variation. Intervention policies
at times have been explicitly designed to
respond to volatility. Further investigation into
the relations among intervention, spreads, and
volatility would be greatly facilitated by a struc-
tural model.
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Agents are identical, with the following constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function:
(1) U=G(u),
where u (cx, c2) = (q
 : ~ '
/






and G{u) = 1/(1 -y)^'
1.
Three important parameters specify prefer-
ences: (3, the discount factor; o, the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution; and y, the rate of relative
risk aversion toward variation in lifetime wealth.
In the economies studied below, agents face un-
certainty about lifetime wealth, so that we can
meaningfully separate attitudes about risk aversion
from those concerning the time pattern of con-
sumption. Once individuals enter period 1, they
face neither uncertain income nor risky assets.
Thus, agents formulate consumption plans contin-
gent on the level of lifetime wealth. Lifetime utility,
but not the consumption strategy, depends on the
risk-aversion parameter y.
Endowments
Each individual has an endowment of a single
good in each period. At periods 0 and 2, all
agents have identical endowments <I> and y2. At
period 1, each individual receives a privately ob-
servable income level j-,0) = yx + 0, where yx
is the level of per capita income. Consumers
know yx at T= 0, and they learn 8 at T = 1. The
idiosyncratic component of income, 9, is con-
tinuously distributed on (0, 9) with density
function/(0, x) having £(0) = 0 and £(0 | x) =
0 (x is an aggregate shock discussed later). I
assume a continuum of traders indexed at
period 1 by the realized value of 0. Thus, the
analysis proceeds as if each value of the distri-
bution is realized (see Judd [1985]).
Intertemporal
Technology
Along with preferences and endowments, the
actors in the model have a storage technology,
that is, an intertemporal production function
that rewards long-term storage. Goods stored in
T= 0 pay no net interest if removed in period 1,
but pay a gross return R > 1 if left until T= 2, as
shown in table 1.
This provides a tractable case in which the time
paths of investment projects are somewhat irre-
versible. An alternative motivation is that individ-
uals (banks) cannot costlessly liquidate assets
before their maturity. Economywide movements
are captured by introducing randomness into the
intertemporal technology.
R, the technological rate of return, varies
positively with the aggregate shock x. Individ-
uals observe x costlessly and perfectly at T= 0,
so that they know R(x) from the beginning. Fur-
thermore, the distribution of 8 depends on the
aggregate shock. A higher value of x induces a
mean-preserving spread on the distribution of
0,/(0), subjecting agents to more risk. This
assumption is designed to capture the view that
progress benefits some individuals more than
others. Schumpeter (1939) assigns this view a
major role:
Industrial change is never harmonious advance
with all elements of the system actually moving, or
tending to move, in step. At any given time, some
industries move on, others stay behind; and the dis-
crepancies arising from this are an essential element
in the situations that develop, (pp. 101-102)
Thus, I separate the effects of an aggregate
shock into two components. One is an increase in
the productivity of long-term storage, whereby a
positive x increases R. The other is an increase in
the dispersion of the random variable 9. Follow-
ing Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), I let the shift put
more weight in the tails of the distribution.
5 These
effects cause/(9, x) to become riskier (in the
sense of a mean-preserving spread) with increases
in x and cause R (x) to increase in x. That is, the
shock raises market (or technological) interest
rates. Conversely, a negative shock decreases R
and reduces the dispersion of 0.
This connection between a macroeconomic
variable (R) and a microeconomic variable (the
• 5 As the authors point out, this sort of mean-preserving spread
corresponds to natural economic measures of increasing dispersion. Any
risk-averse individual will prefer the old distribution, and the new dis-
tribution will equal the old distribution plus a noise term.TABLE 2
Observation of Shocks
for Three Periods
T = 0 T = 1 T = 2
x realized
/( 8, x) known
8 realized R(x) paid off
SOURCE: Author.
individual's endowment risk) is critical in study-
ing the behavior of optimal bank contracts in
this economy. Because individuals can observe
x at T= 0, knowledge of R (x) and/(8, x) sim-
plifies the analysis by reducing the problem to
comparative statics on the distribution of 8. Addi-
tionally, this specification abstracts from the uncer-
tainty about aggregate shocks and instead empha-
sizes their distributional consequences. I thus con-
centrate on the direct effects of the aggregate
shocks, not on uncertainty about them. To recapit-
ulate, then, agents observe x, and thus /(8, x) in
period 0, and 8 obtains in period 1 (see table 2).
As a benchmark for comparison with later
results, consider the macroeconomic effects of
an aggregate shock in this economy without
contracts. The individual uncertainty about the
distribution of income has no effect on aggre-
gate variables, so it makes sense to examine
only the average individual. The increased dis-
persion caused by the impulse has no effect on
aggregate variables: The per capita change in con-
sumption and savings is the same as if the distribu-
tion of income had been entirely ignored.
The simplicity of this macro model underscores
a point generic to models of this class; namely, this
simple economy can be understood in an aggre-
gate sense by ignoring individual differences and




When facing diversifiable risk, however, agents
in this economy will not accept the market struc-
ture imposed above. The ability to write con-
tracts at y= 0 means that they can improve upon
their initial position by creating a richer institu-
tional structure. In the simple world considered
here, banks arise endogenously to meet that
demand for insurance. The bank is able to pool
agents' diversifiable risk by exploiting the pro-
duction structure of the economy. This section
abstracts from aggregate shocks in order to




Whether the market system produces a bank, an
insurance company, or a security market depends
on the information structure of the economy. If 6
were public information, a regular insurance con-
tract with premiums and payoffs could protect
people against the diversifiable income risk. The
private character of 0 gives rise to adverse selec-
tion, however, and rules out such insurance. Still,
since I assume that individuals may write con-
tracts on any observable quantity, there may be
some other way to trade risk.
In one case, individuals might exchange claims
on long-term storage maturing in 7= 2 after re-
ceiving their random income. Unfortunately, this
ex post security market provides no improvement
over autarky. In equilibrium, arbitrage opportuni-
ties between production and securities imply that
the price of such securities must be one. If a claim
on one unit in storage (/? tomorrow) sold for
more than one, no one would buy it, preferring
instead to place one unit in productive storage. If
the price were below one, no one would sell (see
Diamond and Dybvig [19831 for a more detailed
discussion of this point). Selling these bonds is
thus equivalent to taking goods out of production.
As we have seen, the ability to draw down storage
stocks does not eliminate the possibility of low
first-period income.
6 There is still room for an
institution that can provide insurance and pool risk
even if private income shocks are unobservable.
The Organization
of Banking
I define a bank as a coalition of individuals, per-
haps brought together by an entrepreneur, that
receives a deposit <& in T= 0 and pays interest
rates r0 from T= 0 to T= 1, and rx from T= 1 to
T= 2. Agents can withdraw any fraction of the
account in any period. A bank is linear if the
• 6 I assume that 4> is sufficiently large relative to y, and y2 so that
market equilibrium takes place "off the corner" at the aggregate level.
That is, individuals will want to store some of <£. Also, * is not so large
relative to lifetime wealth that agents wish to deposit in T= 1.interest rate paid is independent of the amount
in the account. A bank provides agents with a
higher level of expected utility than a situation
of autarky because the bank partially insures
agents against income risk. The provision of in-
surance is typically incomplete, because the
bank faces a trade-off between risk-pooling and
the incentives for saving.
Relative to the technological return (or, equiv-
alently, to ex post security markets), banks offer
higher short-term yields (r0 > 1) and lower long-
term yields (r2 < R). This is how banks provide
insurance. To determine the interest rates that
actually occur, take the analysis one step further
and consider the optimal linear bank.
7 This
bank sets r0 and rx to maximize the expected util-
ity of agents given the total resources of the bank
and the decision rules of the individuals. The
analysis closely follows the optimal income taxa-
tion investigations of Mirrlees (1971).
An individual must choose consumption and
savings withdrawal given the bank's interest
rates r0 (from 7= 0 to 7= 1) and rx (from 7= 1
to 7= 2). If r0 > 1, the problem for a rational in-










The solution to this problem provides four func-
tions of the income shock and interest rates: an
indirect utility function, v (8, r0, rx); two con-
sumption functions, c* (8, r0, rx) and c2 (8, r0, rx); and an optimal withdrawal function w* (8, r0, rx).
With a CES utility function, indirect utility is linear
in wealth, v = a(rj) a (r0, r.,6). Since w* =
c* - jj(8), one can straightforwardly show that '
• 7 Haubrich and King (1990) examine such a bank, but with a non-
reversible storage technology. Consideration of linear institutions un-
doubtedly simplifies the analysis, but more important, it prevents the
formation of depositor coalitions that could arbitrage across nonlinearities
in the rate structure. In other words, an interest-rate structure that is non-
linear in the size of withdrawals would be subject to raiding by coalitions
of depositors at T= 1. For example, small depositors might combine
funds and act as a syndicate to obtain the better rates received by large
depositors. This would change the distribution (especially the expected
value) of withdrawals and ruin the bank. A budget just balanced, with
some individuals obtaining low interest rates, has no room for everyone
to receive high rates. A competitive bank simply could not give everyone a
higher interest rate.
assumption (footnote 6) that the initial endow-
ment is large enough so that the withdrawal will
be positive for all 8.
The bank, as a coalition of individuals, wishes
to maximize the depositors' expected utility
EG [v (8, r0 , rx)] subject to a resource con-
straint. This constraint, written as equation (3),
states that the period 0 present value of assets,
<£>, must equal the present value of the liabilities
both in period 1, Ew* (8, r0, rx~), and in period 2,
rx[r0®- Ew* (8, r0 , r,)].
= Ew*(8,ro,rx) (3)
In other words, the bank must be able to cover
all withdrawals. Notice that the bank views total
withdrawals as certain. Thus, Ew * involves
simply "summing" across all depositors. In addi-
tion to the resource constraint (3), the bank is
constrained by the individuals' decision rules,
such as the withdrawal function, which is a
function of bank actions r0 and r, as well as 8.
Banking and
Insurance
What are the characteristics of an optimal bank-
ing structure? First, consider a small increase in
rQ from its initial position of one and a small
decrease in rv The bank must respect its budget
constraint, that is,
(4) O = dro[<b-(l/r1-l / R) E(dc*2/dr0 ) ]
-drx{(y2-Ec2)
+ {l/rl-\/R)E[dc2/d(l/rl)]}/r\.
When evaluated at rx = R, expression (4) be-
comes simply dr0 O = drx(y2 — Ec*2)/r*x . Since Ec 2 > y2, a small increase in r0 requires a
decrease in rv
The effects on expected utility can similarly




-E{G'a[y2-c'2(e)]}drx/rx.Expression (5) indicates that increases in r0 have
an identical wealth effect on all consumers, a is
the marginal utility of a unit of period 1 wealth.
As discussed above, a is invariant to 9 under
CES utility. By contrast, the wealth effect of an
increase in rx is greatest for the largest lenders
in period 1, for whom y2 < c* (0). Requiring




With risk aversion, G" > 0 , so that the covari-
ance term is unambiguously negative and a
small decline in rx raises welfare. Intuitively, by
raising r0 and lowering rv the bank has shifted
wealth from those with high 0 's to the average
individual. The lucky people with high 0 's will
attempt to smooth consumption and save the
windfall, withdrawing relatively little. The lower
rx penalizes them. The unlucky people with a
low 0 withdraw a lot, benefiting from the high
r0. This redistribution provides insurance in T=
0, when 0 is unknown. In effect, in period 0, the
bank offers an individual a security that 1) has a
certain period 1 expected return (<t>dr0), 2) pays




The economic intuition behind these results
(small changes in r0 and rx from the initial posi-
tion r0 = 1 and rx = R) extends to interpretation
of the optimal banking structure. Again, follow-
ing Mirrlees (1971) and Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1980), I derive the result that for the CES case,






where e2 is the compensated semi-elasticity of
second-period consumption with respect to its
price, p2 = — . e2 is a constant because utility is
CES, e2 = (l/c*), and ^ -^ > 0. -^ is the effect
dp2 dp2
of a wealth increment on second-period consump-
tion, and 52 is the risk premium of a private agent
for a consumption bet of the form c*2 / Ec\. Such
a bet has expected utility of one but covaries
negatively with lifetime marginal utility:
82 = - ( cov [G\ c\ (0) ] /EG' Ec\!.
Notice that risk aversion implies rx< R and
thus r0 > 1, both of which preserve the flavor
of the local results above.
Banks and
Other Structures
It is worth comparing this bank with the other
institutions already discussed. In autarky, each
individual agent is subject to income risk. Be-
cause the technology is reversible, no one bene-
fits from being able to sell shares in an ex post
security market, that is, by transferring goods
from T= 2 to T= 1. A simple ex post equity
market, then, does not improve upon autarky,
because it cannot remove any of the income
risk faced by agents.
However, the optimal linear banking structure
provides agents with a higher level of expected
utility than an ex post market does, because it par-
tially insures agents against income risks. The
provision of such insurance is incomplete because
the bank pays for insurance by distorting the inter-
temporal trade-off facing consumers. Relative to
ex post security markets, banks offer higher short-
term yields (r0 > 1) and lower long-term yields
(rx< R). Without income uncertainty, or with full
insurance from another source, the optimal bank
would set r0 = 1 and rx = R, and would serve no
economic purpose.
Notice this classic relation between the bank
and asset markets: The bank creates long-term
assets from short-term liabilities. Though agents
may withdraw money from their account at any
time, the bank balances these withdrawals and
invests partly in long-term production. A non-
classical restriction is the requirement of a choice
of institution. As in other models of this sort
(Diamond and Dybvig [19831, Haubrich and
King [1990], and Jacklin and Bhattacharya [1988]),
a bank and an equity market cannot coexist.
A more detailed analysis of these questions
would proceed by initially characterizing Pareto-
optimal allocations—subject to resource and
incentive constraints—and then asking whether
particular market arrangements can effectively
decentralize these allocations or yield Pareto-
optimal quantities as the outcomes of individual
choices in a specified market. Because this paper
concentrates on the effects of aggregate shocks,
and not on the banking contract per se, it will
not formalize the mechanism-theoretic approach
to this problem. Additionally, a digression herecould not do justice to the many interesting
issues that arise, and would be redundant in
light of the fuller treatment of the banking con-
tract found in Haubrich (1988) and Haubrich
and King (1990). Still, an informal discussion
summarizing results from the other papers can
clarify several related issues.
A key question is which institutions can sup-
port the optimal allocations arising from the
planning problem. A bank contract supports
such allocations, as do some other institutions.
The main difference concerns the possibility of
bank runs. Adding a sequential service con-
straint, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), will
create panics. However, banks without this fea-
ture (and indeed mutual funds issuing derivative
securities) can support the optimal allocations
and remain immune to panics. I consider only
such stable institutions.
An equity market does not support the opti-
mal allocation. Once a bank exists, there are
individual incentives to create a stock market.
This would ruin the bank, however, so the plan-
ner does not allow that market to open. This
exclusivity seems to be a generic defect of this
type of banking model. Haubrich (1988) exam-
ines the informational assumptions allowing
such exclusion. Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988)
interpret banking regulation as a means of pre-
venting the arbitrage that would destroy banks.
Gorton and Haubrich (1987) explore coexis-
tence using a somewhat different model.
Finally, support for the full optimum men-
tioned above requires a nonlinear bank— one
that pays contingent on withdrawal size. The
general form of the contract remains the same,
and the same techniques can be used to charac-
terize the interest-rate schedule, but comparative
statics become intractable. The linear bank
results from the arbitrage conditions discussed
above, which in the planning problem take the
form of "multilateral incentive compatibility con-
straints" (see Haubrich [1988]). The nonlineari-
ties that exist in the real world may result from
the inability to arbitrage the bank—perhaps due
to transactions costs or to the inability of group
members to monitor one another. Still, the linear
bank seems a useful approximation.
III. Banking with
Aggregate Shocks
This section reintroduces fluctuations into the
economy by integrating the banking sector into
the basic macro model. It explores how the
aggregate random variable x influences bank
interest rates and in turn affects savings and con-
sumption. This section illustrates the importance
of contracts in economies with connections
between a macroeconomic variable, R, and a
microeconomic variable, individuals' endow-
ment risk. Recall that a positive x increases R
and induces a mean-preserving spread in/(G),
while a negative draw lowers R and reduces
the dispersion of G. In the presence of banks,
this interaction has important consequences.
Individuals can observe x in T= 0, so that
knowledge of R(x) and/©, x) allows calcula-
tion of the interest rates r0 and rx. This reduces
the problem to comparative statics on the dis-
tribution of 0 and suggests that it is not uncer-
tainty about aggregate shocks that drives banks'
effects on interest rates, but rather the distribu-
tional consequences of such shocks.
It will be easier to examine these effects in
three steps. First, I examine how r, changes with
R if the distribution of 0 remains fixed. Next, I
keep R fixed and note how rx changes with the
dispersion of 9. Finally, I put the two together.
Pure Aggregate
Shocks
The case of an aggregate shock—with no effect
on the uncertainty of income—serves as a
benchmark for comparison with more compli-
cated scenarios. With a "pure" aggregate shock,
if the underlying technological rate of return R
increases, the economy is richer and should be
able to support a higher interest rate on bank
deposits. This is indeed what happens, since
Thus, the direct or "pure" effect of an aggregate
shock moves both bank and market interest
rates in the same direction. The second term in
the equation is model specific: Because the
utility function exhibits constant relative risk
aversion, the increased income leads consumers
to demand less insurance for a given absolute
risk. This term would be absent with constant
absolute risk aversion. A short calculation re-
veals that r0 rises with R; economically, because
of a higher payoff to storage, the bank can
afford to distribute more goods, and both bank
and market interest rates increase.nr
Pure Distribution
Effects
The next determination is how banks' interest rates
move when individuals are subject to greater
uncertainty. I wish to sign dz/dx; that is, to hold
R fixed, but to allow x to change/(9). Equation
(7) tells us r^ = z (b 2, dc2/ da, z2) R.
Notice that the CES specification makes e2
constant, and the homotheticity of indifference
curves implies that dc2/da is independent of
the distribution of 8. This means that the only
term changed by a mean-preserving shift in
/(0) is 82. Not surprisingly, the movement in the
interest rate depends on the movement of the
risk premium on period 2 consumption. Recall
that a greater risk premium indicates a greater
demand for insurance, which is provided
by a lower interest rate. Notice that d rx /d 8 2 =
-e2i?/(e2 + 82 + dc*2/da)
2 < 0. Thus, a mean-
preserving spread will decrease rx if it increases
82. Since 82 measures the risk premium on
c2/Ec*2, we expect it to rise with a risker c2,
which in turn is a linear function of 0. Intuitively,
a positive shock, say a good harvest, will increase
the uncertainty of individual incomes. This drives
up 82, the risk premium on the lifetime consump-
tion gamble, and sends rx down. The bank pools
some of the increased risk by pushing rx and r0
closer together, hence further redistributing in-
come from the lucky to the unlucky.
The clear intuition on the effects of a mean-
preserving spread belies the complexity of the
actual calculation. The multiperiod, multiple-
choice problem does not fit the one-variable
techniques of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970,
1971). In a closely related problem, calculating
the change in the optimal linear income tax
with a change in the ability distribution, Stern
(1976) resorts to numerical examples even after
specifying both utility and distribution func-
tions. With problems in such a simple case, it is
not surprising that more general specifications
prove intractable.
Calculating the change in 82 is straightforward
when G takes the form of log utility.
8 This is
the only case for which an intertemporal inves-
tor facing a changing investment opportunity
set will act as if he were a one-period maximizer
(Merton [1982]). With log utility, changes in the
interest rate alone do not alter consumption or
savings decisions, and the result is a one-period
problem on which standard comparative static
• 8 The dynamic asset pricing literature often exploits this tractability,
which stems from the offsetting income and substitution effects.
techniques can be used. In this paper, because
interest rates differ across periods, individuals
face a changing investment opportunity set.
With that problem simplified, comparative statics
on the bank problem become feasible. The ap-
pendix carries out the calculation for log utility and
examines the robustness of the result. A mean-
preserving spread also increases the risk premium
in another tractable case, quadratic utility.
Another way to obtain results is to restrict the
distribution function. The appendix shows that
for arbitrary utility functions, a two-point dis-
tribution yields the required result, as do certain
changes related to the martingale measure of
risk. Thus, although the general case seems in-




The pure aggregate shock moves the underly-
ing interest rate. The pure distribution effect, on
the other hand, increases individual uncertainty
and induces people to pool more risk by accept-
ing a lower interest rate. The combination of
both effects means that a macroeconomic distur-
bance will increase bank interest rates, but by
less than the underlying rate. In other words, the
aggregate shock x moves R directly, increasing
both rx and r0. In fact, without changes in in-
dividual uncertainty, an efficient bank would
raise rx proportionately with R. The distribution
effect by itself lowers rx when x rises. Both
effects together imply that rx moves by less than
R. Further, we expect that the direct effect dom-
inates the distributional (indirect) effect, and
both r: and R increase (that is, bank rates move
less than one-to-one with the underlying inter-
est rates). Similarly, a negative x decreases R,
and the distribution effect raises rv Again, slug-
gishness results. Since the two effects of x—an
increase in R and a greater dispersion of 9 —
are mathematically distinct, we must simply as-
sume the dominance of the direct effect. This
assumption accords with the macroeconomic
evidence and theories mentioned in section I.
This distribution effect also influences r0. The
bank's budget constraint, (3), implies that a
decrease in rx requires an increase in r0. When
the dispersion of 8 rises, the bank provides more
insurance by increasing r0 and decreasing rv
This affects consumption and savings in two ways:
The higher r0 augments the wealth of all agents as
of T= 1, and the lower r, makes current con-
sumption more attractive. These distributionalconsequences counteract the intertemporal
effects of the pure gain in R, which induces
people to consume more later.
The effect on interest rates is an immediate
illustration of how contracts change the qualita-
tive macroeconomic behavior of this economy.
As the intertemporal price, the interest rate has
additional effects. In general, comparing the
path of aggregate disturbances will be compli-
cated, but in the case of log utility, simple results
emerge. The sluggish adjustment of interest
rates dampens the effect of aggregate shocks on
consumption and savings. Some lengthy but
straightforward calculations show that
dc\ dc\
(8) 0 > —— (bank) > -r— (no bank), and
dx dx
(9) ~ (no bank) > -^r
1 (bank) > 0.
dx dx
Thus, though idiosyncratic risk "washes out"
across all agents, it affects the economy because
agents form institutions and write contracts to
protect against that risk. Even if interest rates
adjust one-to-one, the deviation of the bank rate
from the technological rate alters behavior. More
significant, however, is that the bank filters the
effect of the shock by changing the underlying
risk. Hence, ignoring or simply exogenously im-
posing institutions on a macro model seriously
distorts conclusions. Figures 1 and 2 give a
flavor of possible applications of this model and
show that there are useful and tractable exten-
sions of the representative-agent framework.
IV. Conclusion
This paper illustrates how institutions play a cen-
tral role in aggregate phenomena. In this section, I
argue that the results hold in a very general con-
text and that the general study of institutions aris-
ing from competition is essential for adequate
macroeconomics.
The analysis presented above extends beyond
bank rates. Other financial institutions play a part
in macroeconomic disturbances, and although
this paper argues in terms of risk-pooling, the
underlying ideas pertain to risk-shifting as well.
The institution studied here is termed a bank, but
as a pure financial intermediary, its functions may
be duplicated by an appropriate derivative secu-
rity market.
For example, consider dividend payments.
When individuals face private risks, dividend
payments may set the return on equity to pro-
vide insurance. An interaction between macro-
and microeconomic shocks leads to dividends
that adjust slowly (Copeland and Weston
[1979]).
In fact, the analysis is not limited to financial
institutions: Some recent work on labor con-
tracts also discusses the role of aggregate shocks
as signals about unobservable individual distur-
bances. Haubrich and King (1991) examine a
case in which the money supply signals individ-
ual dispersion, leading to the non-neutrality of
perceived money. Grossman, Hart, and Maskin
(1983) focus on economies where asymmetric
information between firms and workers pro-
duces cyclical unemployment.
These new markets and institutions attempt
to avoid the problems of adverse selection aris-
ing from private information. In this sense, de-
rivative security markets or institutions occupy
niches similar to other schemes discussed in the
literature. In order for the institution to survive,
the incentive structures must force agents to
reveal themselves at least partially. Markets can-
not always completely exploit this information,
because to do so would distort the incentives
that allowed revelation in the first place.
This paper provides an equilibrium analysis
of how endogenously arising financial institu-
tions alter the impact of macroeconomic shocks.
It explains the modifications in consumption
and investment decisions as reactions to prices
that react sluggishly to the underlying economic
disturbances. This suggests that income distribu-
tion plays a major role in aggregate disturbances,
such as business cycles. It also suggests that a
relevant business cycle theory eventually must
explicitly model why banks exist and why they
take their present form. This explanation of
bank rate sluggishness illustrates a powerful
principle: When aggregate disturbances also
have distributional consequences, the pattern of
efficient contract-specified prices can change.Appendix
In this appendix, I calculate the change in the
risk premium 82 caused by an increase in indi-
vidual uncertainty. First, recall that indirect util-
ity and optimal second-period consumption are
(Al) v=a(r)[w(Q)]and
(A2) c* = r[l - h(p2) ] lw(Q) ] = q(r) [w(Q)).
82 can be written as
(A3) 8 2 = - [ ~y c2) - Ec2 Ev-i]/Ec2
Using (Al) and (A2), I rearrange (A3) to obtain
(A4) 1 -82 = E[w(6)
l-V]/E[w(G))E[w(Q)~y].
To discuss how 82 changes with increases in the
dispersion of 0,1 employ the techniques of
Sandmo (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970,
1971) and stretch the distribution by replacing G













Without loss of generality, I evaluate this expres-
sion at x = 1.
9]
Notice that the first and second terms of this ex-
pression are positive, as are all the terms after
the minus sign (fourth, fifth, and sixth terms).
The third term is negative when y < 1, making
the entire derivative unambiguously positive.
Thus, an increase in x increases 52 and de-
creases rv When y< 1, the sign of expression
(A4) becomes ambiguous. Without explicitly
determining its sign, though, we can gain some
idea of its properties. Simple numerical exam-
ples involving uniform distributions indicate
(A5) - [Ew(Q)Ew(Q)-yE[(l -y)
yEw(&)E[- yw(Q)
that in some cases (A4) is positive. Additionally,
(A4) is always positive with a discrete, symmet-
ric, two-point distribution. To see this, write the
numerator of (A5) as
The first term is always negative. I can use the
linearity of wealth to express w as (a ± M),
where the distribution is the two-point discrete
distribution with probability 1/2 on k and -k.
The sign of (A5) is then the opposite of
(a - k)
} ~
y (a + k)
x ~y (-4 a), which is always
negative. Thus, the risk premium moves positively
withx.
When G is quadratic, G(x) = x- Vi bx
2, the
result also holds. Substitute into (A4) to obtain
(A6) 1-8,=
Ell - b(a a + a9)] E[q(a + 9)]
With a mean-preserving spread on 9, only the
numerator of (A6) changes, becoming
E[q{\ + 9)] - baqE(a
2 + 2a0) - baq£(9
2) .
The MPS on 9 increases the variance, proving
the result.
For general utility functions, 1 - 82 can be ex-
pressed as a "martingale measure of risk" as in
Nachman (1979, section 4.1). Then, if/ is the dis-
tribution for c2,
C' C
f*(c) = —7 . /= T f(c). EG )G'f{c)dc
Defining El (c) - J cf* (c) dc, Nachman extends
Rothschild and Stiglitz's arguments to show
Ej (c) < E(c). The assumption on the movement
from/ to g implies E* (c) < E(c). Similarly, if g
is riskier than/*, it is also risker than/ The
new expression for 1 - 8 2 is E* (c) < E (c) <
E*r(c) < EAc). Again, the desired result follows.
Here, the function Gis general, but a large shift
in dispersion is required.References
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